No. 87-1167 Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by Supreme Court of the United States
Hollins University 
Hollins Digital Commons 
Ann B. Hopkins Papers Manuscript Collections 
5-1-1989 
No. 87-1167 Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.hollins.edu/hopkins-papers 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons 
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been ,>re-
pared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See 
United Sflltes v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPKINS 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
No. 87-1167. Argued October 31, 1988-Decided May 1, 1989 
Respondent was a senior manager and an officer in an office of petitioner 
professional accounting partnership when she was proposed for partner-
ship in 1982. She was neither offered nor denied partnership but in-
stead her candidacy was held for reconsideration the following year. 
When the partners in her office later refused to repropose her for part-
nership, she sued petitioner in Federal District under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act), charging that it had discriminated against 
her on the basis of sex in its partnership decisions. The District Court 
ruled in respondent's favor on the question of liability, holding that peti-
tioner had unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of sex by 
consciously giving credence and effect to partners' comments about her 
that resulted from sex stereotyping. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Both courts held that an employer who has allowed a discriminatory mo-
tive to play a part in an employment decision must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that it would have made the same decision in the ab-
sence of discrimination, and that petitioner had not carried this burden. 
Heul: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 
263 U. S. App. D. C. 321, 825 F . 2d 458, reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACK-
MUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS, concluded that when a plaintiff in a Title 
VII case proves that her gender played a part in an employment deci-
sion, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability by proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision 
even if it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into account. The courts 
below erred by requiring petitioner to make its proof by clear and con-
vincing evidence. Pp. 7-28. 
(a) The balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives 
established by Title VII by eliminating certain bases for distinguishing 
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among employees while otherwise preserving employers' freedom of 
choice is decisive in this case. The words ''because of" in § 703(a)(l) of 
the Act, which forbids an employer to make an adverse decision against 
an employee ''because of such individual's ... sex,'' requires looking at 
all of the reasons, both legitimate and illegitimate, contributing to the 
decision at the time it is made. The preservation of employers' freedom 
of choice means that an employer will not be liable if it can prove that, if 
it had not taken gender into account, it would have come to the same 
decision. This Court's prior decisions demonstrate that the plaintiff 
who shows that an impermissible motive played a motivating part in an 
adverse employment decision thereby places the burden on the defend-
ant to show that it would have made the same decision in the absence of 
the unlawful motive. Here, petitioner may not meet its burden by 
merely showing that respondent's interpersonal problems-abrasiveness 
with staff members-constituted a legitimate reason for denying her 
partnership; instead, petitioner must show that its legitimate reason, 
standing alone, would have induced petitioner to deny respondent part-
nership. Pp. 8-22. 
(b) Conventional rules of civil litigation generally apply in Title VII 
cases, and one of these rules is that the parties need only prove their 
case by a preponderance of the evidence. Pp. 22-25. 
(c) The District Court's finding that sex stereotyping was permitted 
to play a part in evaluating respondent as a candidate for partnership 
was not clearly erroneous. This finding is not undermined by the fact 
that many of the suspect comments made about respondent were made 
by partners who were supporters rather than detractors. Pp. 25-28. 
JUSTICE WHITE, although concluding that the Court of Appeals efred 
in requiring petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it 
would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the 
improper motive, rather than merely requiring proof by a preponderance 
of the evidence as in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 
429 U. S. 27 4, which sets forth the proper approach to causation in this 
case, also concluded that the plurality here errs in seeming to require, at 
least in most cases, that the employer carry its burden by submitting ob-
jective evidence that the same result would have occurred absent the un-
lawful motivation. In a mixed motive case, where the legitimate motive 
found would have been ample grounds for the action taken, and the em-
ployer credibly testifies that the action would have been taken for the 
legitimate reasons alone, this should be ample proof, and there is no spe-
cial requirement of objective evidence. This would even more plainly be 
the case where the employer denies any illegitimate motive in the first 
place but the court finds that illegitimate, as well as legitimate, factors 
motivated the adverse action. Pp. 1-3. 
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JUSTICE O'CoNNOR, although agreeing that on the facts of this case, 
th~ burden of persuasion should shift to petitioner to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same deci-
sion absent consideration of respondent's gender, and that this burden 
shift is properly part of the liability phase of the litigation, concluded 
that the plurality misreads Title VII's substantive causation require-
ment to command burden shifting if the employer's decisional process is 
"tainted" by awareness of sex or race in any way, and thereby effectively 
eliminates the requirement. JUSTICE O'CONNOR also concluded that the 
burden shifting rule should be limited to cases such as the present in 
which the employer has created uncertainty as to causation by know-
ingly giving substantial weight to an impermissible criterion. Pp. 1-19. 
(a) Contrary to the plurality's conclusion, Title VII's plain language 
making it unlawful for an employer to undertake an adverse emplpyment 
action ''because of" prohibited factors and the statute's legislative history 
demonstrate that a substantive violation only occurs when consideration 
of an illegitimate criterion is the ''but-for'' cause of the adverse action. 
However, nothing in the language, history, or purpose of the statute 
prohibits adoption of an evidentiary rule which places the burden of per-
suasion on the defendant to demonstrate that legitimate concerns would 
have justified an adverse employment action where the plaintiff has con-
vinced the factfinder that a forbidden factor played a substantial role in 
the employment decision. Such a rule has been adopted in tort and 
other analogous types of cases, where leaving the burden of proof on the 
plaintiff to prove ''but-for" causation would be unfair or contrary to the 
deterrent purposes embodied in the concept of duty of care. Pp. 2-9. 
(b) Although the burden shifting rule adopted here departs from the 
careful framework established by McDonnell Dougla.s Corp. v. Green, 
411 U. S. 792, and Texas Dept. of Community Affafrs v. Burdine, 450 
U. S. 248-which clearly contemplate that an individual disparate treat-
ment plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion throughout the litigation-
that departure is justified in cases such as the present where the plain-
tiff, having presented direct evidence that the employer placed substan-
tial, though unquantifiable, reliance on a forbidden factor in making an 
employment decision, has taken her proof as far as it could go, such that 
it is appropriate to require the defendant, which has created the uncer-
tainty as to causation by considering the illegitimate criterion, to show 
that its decision would have been justified by wholly legitimate concerns. 
Moreover, a rule shifting the burden in these circumstances will not con-
flict with other Title VII policies, particularly its prohibition on pref-
erential treatment based on prohibited factors. Watson v. Fort Worth 
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.-, distinguished. Pp. 9-15. · 
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(c) Thus, in order to justify shifting the burden on the causation issue 
to the defendant, a disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct evi-
dence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an il-
legitimate criterion in reaching their decision. Such a showing entitles 
the factflnder to presume that the employer's discriminatory animus 
made a difference in the outcome, and, if the employer fails to carry its 
burden of persuasion, to conclude that the employer's decision was made 
''because of" consideration of the illegitimate factor, thereby satisfying 
the substantive standard for liability under Title VII. This burden 
shifting rule supplements the McDonnell D011glas-Burdine framework, 
which continues to apply where the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the 
threshold standard set forth herein. Pp. 16-18. 
BRENNAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an 
opinion, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. 
WHITE, J., and O'CONNOR, J., filed opinions concurring in the judgment. 
KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and 
SCALIA, J., joined. 
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 87-1167 
PRICE WATERHOUSE, PETITIONER v. ANN B. 
HOPKINS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
_ APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[May 1, 1989] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court 
and delivered an opinion, in which JUSTICE MARSHALL, Jus-
TICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS join. 
. Ann Hopkins was a senior manager in an office of Price 
Waterhouse when -she was proposed for partnership in 1982. 
She was neither offered nor denied admission to the partner-
ship; instead, her candidacy was held for reconsideration the 
following year. When the partners in her office later re-
fused to repropose her for partnership, she sued Price 
Waterhouse under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., charg-
ing that the firm had discriminated against her on the basis of 
sex in its decisions regarding partnership. Judge Gesell in 
the District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in her 
favor on the question of liability, 618 F. Supp. 1109 (1985), 
and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
affirmed. 263 U. S. App. D. C. 321, 825 F. 2d 458 (1987). 
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts 
of Appeals concerning the respective burdens of proof of a de-
fendant_ and plaintiff in a suit under Title VII when it has 
been shown that an employment decision resulted from a 
mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives. 485 U. S. 
-(1988). 
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I 
At Price Waterhouse, a nationwide professional accounting 
partnership, a senior manager becomes a candidate for part-
nership when the partners in her local office submit her name 
as a candidate. All of the other partners in the firm are then 
invited to submit written comments on each candidate- · 
either on a "long" or a "short" form, depending on the part-
ner's degree of exposure to the candidate. Not every part-
ner in the firm submits comments on every candidate. After 
reviewing the comments and interviewing the partners who 
submitted them, the firm's Admissions Committee makes a 
recommendation to the Policy Board. This recommendation 
will be either that the firm accept the candidate for partner-
ship, put her application on "hold," or deny her the promotion 
outright. The Policy Board then decides whether to submit 
the candidate's name to the entire partnership for a vote, to 
"hold" her candidacy, or to reject her. The recommendation 
of the Admissions Committee, and the decision of the Policy 
Board, are not controlled by fixed guidelines: a certain num-
ber of positive comments from partners will not guarantee a 
candidate's admission to the partnership, nor will a specific 
quantity of negative comments necessarily defeat her appli-
cation. Price Waterhouse places no limit on the number of 
persons whom it will admit to the partnership in any given 
year. 
Ann Hopkins· had worked at Price Waterhouse's Office of 
Government Services in Washington, D. C., for five years 
when the partners in that office proposed her as a candidate 
for partnership. Of the 662 partners at the firm at that time, 
7 were women. Of the 88 persons proposed for partnership 
that year, only I-Hopkins-was a woman. Forty-seven of 
these candidates were admitted to the partnership, 21 were 
rejected, and 20-including Hopkins-were ''held" for re-
consideration the following year. 1 Thirteen of the 32 part-
1 Before the time for reconsideration crune, two of the partners in Hop-
kins' office withdrew their support for her, and the office informed her that 
she would not be reconsidered for partnership. Hopkins then resigned. 
;~ 
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ners who had submitted comments on Hopkins supported her 
bid for partnership. Three partners recommended that her 
candidacy be placed on hold, eight stated that they did not 
have an informed opinion about her, and eight recommended 
that she be denied partnership. 
In a jointly prepared statement supporting her candidacy, 
the partners in Hopkins' office showcased her successful 2-
year effort to secure a $25 million contract with the Depart-
ment of State, labeling it "an outstanding performance" and 
one that Hopkins carried out "virtually at the partner level." 
Plaintiff's Exh. 15. Despite Price Waterhouse's attempt at 
t:rial to minimize her contribution to this project, Judge Ge-
sell specifically found that Hopkins had "played a key role in 
Price Waterhouse's successful effort to win a multi-million 
dollar contract with the Department of State." 618 F. 
Supp., at 1112. Indeed, he went on, "[n]one of the other 
partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that year had a 
comparable record in terms of successfully securing major 
contracts for the partnership." Ibid. 
The partners in Hopkins' office praised her character as 
well as her accomplishments, describing her in their joint 
statement as "an outstanding professional" who had a "deft 
touch," a "strong character, independence and integrity." 
Plaintiff's Exh. 15. Clients appear to have agreed with 
these assessments. At trial, one official from the State De-
partment described her as "extremely competent, intelli-
gent," "strong and forthright, very productive, energetic and 
creative." Tr. 150. Another high-ranking official praised 
Hopkins' decisiveness, broadmindedness, and "intellectual 
Price Waterhouse does not challenge the Court of Appeals' conclusion that 
the refusal to repropose her for partnership amounted to a constructive 
discharge. That court remanded the case to the District Court for further 
proceedings to determine appropriate relief, and those proceedings have 
been stayed pending our decision. Brief for Petitioner 15, n. 3. We are 
concerned today only with Price Waterhouse's decision to place Hopkins' 
candidacy on hold. Decisions pertaining to advancement to partnership 
are, of course, subject to challenge under Title VII. Hishon v. King & 
S'J)O,l,ding, 467 U. S. 69 (1984). 
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clarity''; she was, in his words, "a stimulating conversational-
ist." Id., at 156-157. Evaluations such as these led Judge 
Gesell to conclude that Hopkins ''had no difficulty dealing 
with clients and her clients appear to have been very pleased 
with her work'' and that she "was generally viewed as a 
highly competent project leader who worked long hours, 
pushed vigorously to meet deadlines and demanded much 
from the multidisciplinary staffs with which she worked." 
618 F. Supp., at 1112-1113. 
On too many occasions, however, Hopkins' aggressiveness 
apparently spilled over into abrasiveness. Staff members 
seem to have borne the brunt of Hopkins' brusqueness. 
Long before her bid for partnership, partners evaluating her 
work had counseled her to improve her relations with staff 
members. Although later evaluations indicate an improve-
ment, Hopkins' perceived shortcomings in this important 
area eventually doomed her bid for partnership. Virtually 
all of the partners' negative remarks about Hopkins-even 
those of partners supporting her-had to do with her "inter-
personal skills." Both "[s]upporters and opponents of her 
candidacy," stressed Judge Gesell, "indicated that she was 
sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work 
with and impatient with staff." Id., at 1113. 
There were clear signs, though, that some of the partners 
reacted negatively to Hopkins' personality because she was a 
woman. One partner described her as "macho" (Defendant's 
Exh. 30);. another suggested that she "overcompensated for 
being a woman" (Defendant's Exh. 31); a third advised her to 
take "a course at charm school" (Defendant's Exh. 27). Sev-
eral partners criticized her use of profanity; in response, one 
partner suggested that those partners objected to her swear-
ing only ''because it[']s a lady using foul language." Tr. 321. 
Another supporter explained that Hopkins ''ha[d] matured 
from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr to 
an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady 
ptr candidate." Defendant's Exh. 27. But it was the man 
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who, as ,Judge Gesell found, bore responsibility for explaining 
to Hopkins the reasons for the Policy Board's decision to 
place her candidacy on hold who delivered the coup de grace: 
in order to improve her chances for partnership, Thomas 
Beyer advised, Hopkins should "walk more femininely, talk 
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have 
her hair styled, and wear jewelry." 618 F. Supp., at 1117. 
Dr. Susan Fiske, a social psychologist and Associate Pro-
fessor of Psychology at Carnegie-Mellon University, testified 
at trial that the partnership selection process at Price 
Waterhouse was likely influenced by sex stereotyping. Her 
testimony focused not only on the overtly sex-based com-
ments of partners but also on gender-neutral remarks, made 
by partners who knew Hopkins only slightly, that were in-
tensely critical of her. One partner, for example, baldly 
stated that Hopkins was "universally disliked" by staff (De-
fendant's Exh. 27), and another described her as "consist-
ently annoying and irritating" (ibid.); yet these were people 
who had had very little contact with Hopkins. According to 
Fiske, Hopkins' uniqueness (as the only woman in the pool of 
candidates) and the subjectivity of the evaluations made it 
likely that sharply critical remarks such as these were the 
product of sex stereotyping-although Fiske admitted that 
she could not say with certainty whether any particular com-
ment was the result of stereotyping. Fiske based her opin-
ion on a review of the submitted comments, explaining that it 
was commonly accepted practice for social psychologists to 
reach this kind of conclusion without having met any of the 
people involved in the decisionmaking process. 
In previous years, other female candidates for partnership 
also had been evaluated in sex-based terms. As a general 
matter, Judge Gesell concluded, "[c]andidates were viewed 
favorably if partners believed they maintained their femin-
[in]ity while becoming effective professional managers"; in 
this environment, "[t]o be identified as a 'women's lib[b]er' 
was regarded as [a] negative comment." 618 F . Supp., at 
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1117. In fact, the judge found that in previous years "[o]ne 
partner repeatedly commented that he could not consider any 
woman seriously as a partnership candidate and believed that 
women were not even capable of functioning as senior manag-
ers -yet the firm took no action to discourage his comments 
and recorded his vote in the overall summary of the evalua-
tions. " Ibid. 
Judge Gesell found that Price Waterhouse legitimately em-
phasized interpersonal skills in its partnership decisions, and 
also found that the firm had not fabricated its complaints 
about Hopkins' interpersonal skills as a pretext for dis-
crimination. Moreover, he concluded, the firm did not give 
decisive emphasis to such traits only because Hopkins was a 
woman; although there were male candidates who lacked 
these skills but who were admitted to partnership, the judge 
found that these candidates possessed other, positive traits 
that Hopkins lacked. 
The judge went on to decide, however, that some of the 
partners' remarks about Hopkins stemmed from an imper-
missibly cabined view of the proper behavior of women, and 
that Price Waterhouse had done nothing to disavow reliance 
on such comments. He held that Price Waterhouse had un-
lawfully discriminated against Hopkins on the basis of sex by 
consciously giving credence and effect to partners' comments 
that resulted from sex stereotyping. Noting that Price 
Waterhouse could avoid equitable relief by proving by clear 
and convincing evidence that it would have placed Hopkins' 
candidacy on hold even absent this discrimination, the judge 
decided that the firm had not carried this heavy burden. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District court's ultimate 
conclusion, but departed from its analysis in one particular: it 
held that even if a plaintiff proves that discrimination played 
a role in an employment decision, the defendant will not be 
found liable if it proves, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that it would have made the same decision in the absence of 
discrimination. 263 U. S. App. D. C., at 333-334, 825 F . 2d, 
87-1167-0PINION 
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at 470-471. Under this approach, an employer is not 
deemed to have violated Title VII if it proves that it would 
have made the same decision in the absence of an impermissi-
ble motive, whereas under the District Court's approach, the 
employer's proof in that respect only avoids equitable relief. 
We decide today that the Court of Appeals had the better ap-
proach, but that both courts erred in requiring the employer 
to make its proof by clear and convincing evidence. 
II 
The specification of the standard of causation under Title 
VII is a decision about the kind of conduct that violates that 
statute. According to Price Waterhouse, an employer vio-
lates Title VII only if it gives decisive consideration to an em-
ployee's gender, race, national origin, or religion in making a 
decision that affects that employee. On Price Waterhouse's 
theory, even if a plaintiff shows that her gender played a part 
in an employment decision, it is still her burden to show that 
the decision would have been different if the employer had 
not discriminated. In Hopkins' view, on the other hand, an 
employer violates the statute whenever it allows one of these 
attributes to play any part in an employment decision. Once 
a plaintiff shows that this occurred, according to Hopkins, 
the employer's proof that it would have made the same deci-
sion in the absence of discrimination can serve to limit equita-
ble relief but not to avoid a finding ofliability.2 We conclude 
that, as often happens, the truth lies somewhere in-between. 
• This question has, to say the least, left the Circuits in disarray. The 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits require a plaintiff challenging 
an adverse employment decision to show that, but for her gender (or race 
or religion or national origin), the decision would have been in her favor. 
See, e. g., Belli8simo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F. 2d 175, 179 
(CA3 1985), cert. denied, 475 U. S. 1035 (1986); Ross v. Comrm.tnication.s 
Satellite Corp., 759 F. 2d 355, 365-366 (CA41985); Peters v.City of Sh1·eve-
port, 818 F. 2d 1148, 1161(CA51987); McQuillen v. Wi8con.sin Editeation 
Assn. Council, 830 F. 2d 659, 664-665 (CA7 1987). The First, Second, 
Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, hold that once the plaintiff 
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A 
In passing Title VII, Congress made the simple but mo-
mentous announcement that sex, race, religion, and national 
origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or com-
pensation of employees. 3 Yet, the statute does not purport 
to limit the other qualities and characteristics that employers 
may take into account in making employment decisions. 
has shown that a discriminatory motive was a "substantial" or "motivating" 
factor in an employment decision, the employer may avoid a finding of li-
ability only by proving that it would have made the same decision even in 
the absence of discrimination. These courts have either specified that the 
employer must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence or have 
not mentioned the proper standard of proof. See, e. g., Fields v. Clark 
University, 817 F. 2d 931, 936-937 (CAl 1987) ("motivating factor"); Berl 
v. Westchester County, 849 F. 2d 712, 714-715 (CA2 1988) ("substantial 
part"); Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court of Adair County, Ky., 825 F. 2d 111, 115 
(CA6 1987) ("motivating factor"); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715 
F . 2d 1552, 1557 (CAll 1983). The Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit, 
as shown in this case, follows the same rule except that it requires that the 
employer's proof be clear and convincing rather than merely preponderant. 
263 U.S. App. D. C. 321, 333-334, 825 F. 2d458, 470-471 (1987); see also 
Toney v. Block, 227 U. S. App. D. C. 273,275; 705 F . 2d 1364, 1366 (1983) 
(Scalia, J.) (it would be "destructive of the purposes of [Title VII] to re-
quire the plaintiff to establish . . . the difficult hypothetical proposition 
that, had there been no discrimination, the employment decision would 
have been made in his favor"). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
also requires clear and convincing proof, but it goes further by holding that 
a Title VII violation is made out as soon as the plaintiff shows that an im-
permissible motivation played a part in an employment decision-at which 
point the employer may avoid reinstatement and an award of backpay by 
proving that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the 
unlawful motive. See, e. g. Fadhl v. City and County of San Fmncisco, 
741 F. 2d 1163, 1165-1166 (CA9 1984) (Kennedy, J.) ("significant factor"). 
Last, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit draws the same distinc-
tion as the Ninth between the liability and remedial phases of Title VII liti-
gation, but requires only a preponderance of the evidence from the em-
ployer. See, e. g., Bibbs v. Block, 778 F. 2d 1318, 1320-1324 (CA8 1985) 
(en bane) ("discernible factor''). 
1 We disregard, for purposes of this discussion, the special context of 
affirmative action. 
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The converse, therefore, of "for cause" legislation,' Title VII 
eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among employees 
while otherwise preserving employers' freedom of choice. 
This balance between employee rights and employer preroga-
tives turns out to be decisive in the case before us. 
Congress' intent to forbid employers to take gender into 
account in making employment decisions appears on the face 
of the statute. In now-familiar language, the statute forbids 
an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any indi-
vidual, or otherwise to discriminate with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," 
or to ''limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual's ... sex." 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), (2) 
(emphasis added). 5 We take these words to mean that 
gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions. To con-
strue the words ''because of" as colloquial shorthand for "but-
for causation," as does Price Waterhouse, is to misunder-
' Congress specifically declined to require that an employment decision 
have been ''for cause" in order to escape an affirmative penalty (such as 
reinstatement or backpay) from a court. As introduced in the House, the 
bill that became Title VII forbade such affirmative relief if an "individual 
was ... refused employment or advancement, or was suspended or dis-
charged/or cause." H. R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1963) (emphasis 
added). The phrase "for cause" eventually was deleted in favor of the 
phrase ''for any reason other than" one of the enumerated characteristics. 
See 110 Cong. Rec. 2567-2571 (1964). Representative Celler explained 
that this substitution "specif[ied] cause"; in his view, a court "cannot find 
any violation of the act which is based on facts other ... than discrimina-
tion on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin." Id., at 
2567. 
6 In this Court, Hopkins for the first time argues that Price Waterhouse 
violated § 703(a)(2) when it subjected her to a biased decisionmaking proc-
ess that ''tended to deprive" a woman of partnership on the basis of her 
sex. Since Hopkins did not make this argument below, we do not address 
it. 
87-1167 -OPINION 
10 PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPICTNS 
stand them. 6 
But-for causation is a hypothetical construct. In deter-
mining whether a particular factor was a but-for cause of a 
given event, we begin by assuming that that factor was 
present at the time of the event, and then ask whether, even 
if that factor had been absent, the event nevertheless would 
have transpired in the same way. The present, active tense 
of the operative verbs of § 703(a)(l) ("to fail or refuse"), in 
contrast, turns our attention to the actual moment of the 
event in question, the adverse employment decision. The 
critical inquiry, the one commanded by the words of 
§ 703(a)(l), is whether gender was a factor in the employment 
decision at the rrwment it was made. Moreover, since we 
know that the words "because of" do not mean "solely be-
cause of," 7 we also know that Title VII meant to condemn 
even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and il-
legitimate considerations. When, therefore, an employer 
considers both gender and legitimate factors at the time of 
making a decision, that decision was "because of" sex and the 
other, legitimate considerations-even if we may say later, in 
the context of litigation, that the decision would have been 
the same if gender had not been taken into account. 
•we made passing reference to a similar question in McDonald v. 
Santa Fe Trail Trans-portation Co., 427 U. S. 273, 282, n. 10 (1976), where 
we stated that when a Title VII plaintiff seeks to show that an employer's 
explanation for a challenged employment decision is pretextual, "no more 
is required to be shown than that race was a 'but for' cause." This pas-
sage, however, does not suggest that the plaintiff must show but-for cause; 
it indicates only that if she does so, she prevails. More important, Mc-
Donald dealt with the question whether the employer's stated reason for 
its decision was the reason for its action; unlike the case before us today, 
therefore, McDonald did not involve mixed motives. This difference is 
decisive in distinguishing this case from those involving "pretext." See 
infra, at 16. 
1 Congress specifically rejected an amendment that would have placed 
the word "solely" in front of the words ''because of." 110 Cong. Rec. 2728, 
13837 (1964). 
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To attribute this meaning to the words "because of" does 
not, as the dissent asserts, post, at 4, divest them of causal 
significance. A simple example illustrates the point. Sup-
pose two physical forces act upon and move an object, and 
suppose that either force acting alone would have moved the 
object. As the dissent would have it, neither physical force 
was a "cause" of the motion unless we can show that but for 
one or both of them, the object would not have moved; to use 
the dissent's terminology, both forces were simply "in the 
air" unless we can identify at least one of them as a but-for 
cause of the object's movement. Post, at 13. Events that 
are causally overdetermined, in other words, may not have 
any "cause" at all. This cannot be so. 
We need not leave our commonsense at the doorstep when 
we interpret a statute. It is difficult for us to imagine that, 
in the simple words "because of," Congress meant to obligate 
a plaintiff to identify the precise causal role played by legiti-
mate and illegitimate motivations in the employment decision 
she challenges. We conclude, instead, that Congress meant 
to obligate her to prove that the employer relied upon sex-
based considerations in coming to its decision. 
Our interpretation of the words ''because of" also is sup-
ported by the fact that Title VII does identify one circum-
stance in which an employer may take gender into account in 
making an employment decision, namely, when gender is a 
''bona fide occupational qualification [(BFOQ)] reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of th[e] particular business 
or enterprise." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(e). The only plausi-
ble inference to draw from this provision is that, in all other 
circumstances, a person's gender may not be considered in 
making decisions that affect her. Indeed, Title VII even for-
bids employers to make gender an indirect stumbling block to 
employment opportunities. An employer may not, we have 
held, condition employment opportunities on the satisfaction 
of facially neutral tests or qualifications that have a dispro-
portionate, adverse impact on members of protected groups 
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when those tests or qualifications are not required for per-
formance of the job. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & 
Trust, 487 U. S. -- (1988); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
u. s. 424 (1971). 
To say that an employer may not take gender into account 
is not, however, the end of the matter, for that describes only 
one aspect of Title VII. The other important aspect of the 
statute is its preservation of an employer's remaining free-
dom of choice. We conclude that the preservation of this 
freedom means that an employer shall not be liable if it can 
prove that, even if it had not taken gender into account, it 
would have come to the same decision regarding a particular 
person. The statute's maintenance of employer preroga-
tives is evident from the statute itself and from its history, 
both in Congress and in this Court. 
To begin with, the existence of the BFOQ exception shows 
Congress' unwillingness to require employers to change the 
very nature of their operations in response to the statute. 
And our emphasis on "business necessity'' in disparate-
impact cases, see Watson and Griggs, and on "legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason[s]" in disparate-treatment cases, 
. see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 
(1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U. S. 248 (1981), results from our awareness of Title VII's 
balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives. 
In McDonnell Douglas, we· described as follows Title VII's 
goal to eradicate discrimination while preserving workplace 
efficiency: "The broad, overriding interest, shared by em-
ployer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy 
workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral em-
ployment and personnel decisions. In the implementation of 
such decisions, it is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates 
no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise." 411 U. S., at 
801. 
When an employer ignored the attributes enumerated in 
the statute, Congress hoped, it naturally would focus on the 
--~-- , -:- - --,--- -,,,, . -· ·· 
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qualifications of the applicant or employee. The intent to 
drive employers to focus on qualifications rather than on 
race, religion, sex, or national origin is the theme of a good 
deal of the statute's legislative history. An interpretive 
memorandum entered into the Congressional Record by Sen-
ators Case and Clark, comanagers of the bill in the Senate, is 
representative of this general theme. 8 According to their 
memorandum, Title VII "expressly protects the employer's 
right to insist that any prospective applicant, Negro or 
white, must meet the applicable job qualifications. Indeed, 
the very purpose of title VII is to promote hiring on the basis 
of job qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or 
color." 9 110 Cong. Rec. 7247 (1964), quoted in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., swpra, at 434. - -The mem_orandum went on: 
"To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference 
in treatment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in 
treatment or favor which are prohibited by section 704 are 
those which are based on any five of the forbidden criteria: 
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Any other cri-
"We have in the past aclmowledged the authoritativeness of this inter-
pretive memorandum, written by the two bipartisan "captains" of Title 
VII. See, e. g., Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561, 581, n. 14 (1984). 
9 Many of the legislators' statements, such as the memorandum quoted 
in text, focused specifically on race rather than on gender or religion or na-
tional origin. We do not, however, limit their statements to the context of 
race, but instead we take them as general statements on the meaning of 
Title VII. The somewhat bizarre path by which "sex" came to be included 
as a forbidden criterion for employment-it was included in an attempt to 
defeat the bill, see C. & B. Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative 
History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 115-117 (1985)-does not persuade us 
that the legislators' statements pertaining to race are irrelevant to cases 
alleging gender discrimination. The amendment that added "sex" as one 
of the forbidden criteria for employment was passed, of course, and the 
statute on its face treats each of the enumerated categories exactly the 
same. 
By the same token, our specific references to gender throughout this 
opinion, and the principles we announce, apply with equal force to dis-
crimination based on race, religion, or national origin. 
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terion or qualification for employment is not affected by this 
title." 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964). 
Many other legislators made statements to a similar effect; 
we see no need to set out each remark in full here. The cen-
tral point is this: while an employer may not take gender into 
account in making an employment decision (except in those 
very narrow circumstances in which gender is a BFOQ), it is 
free to decide against a woman for other reasons. We think 
these principles require that, once a plaintiff in a Title VII 
case shows that gender played a motivating part in an em-
ployment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of li-
ability10 only by proving that it would have made the same 
10 Hopkins argues that once she made this showing, she was entitled to a 
finding that Price Waterhouse had discriminated against her on the basis of 
sex; as a consequence, she says, the partnership's proof could only limit the 
relief she received. She relies on Title VII's § 706(g), which permits a 
court to award affirmative relief when it finds that an employer ''has inten-
tionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment 
practice," and yet forbids a court to order reinstatement of, or backpay to, 
"an individual . . . if such individual was refused . . . employment or ad-
vancement or was suspended or discharged for any rea.son other than dis-
crimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 
U. S. C. § 2000-5(g) (emphasis added). We do not take this provision to 
mean that a court inevitably can find a violation of the statute without hav-
ing considered whether the employment decision would have been the 
same absent the impermissible motive. That would be to interpret 
§ 706(g)-a provision defining remedie.s-to influence the substantive com-
mands of the statute. We think that this provision merely limits courts' 
authority to award affirmative relief in those circumstances in which a vi-
olation of the statute is not dependent upon the effect of the employer's 
discriminatory practices on a particular employee, as in pattern-or-practice 
suits and class actions. "The crucial difference between an individual's 
claim of discrimination and a class action alleging a general pattern or prac-
tice of discrimination is manifest. The inquiry regarding an individual's 
claim is the reason for a particular employment decision, while 'at the liabil-
ity stage of a pattern-or-practice trial the focus often will not be on individ-
ual hiring decisions, but on a pattern of discriminatory decisionmaking.'" 
Cooper v. Federal Re.serve Bank of Richmond, 467 U. S. 867, 876 (1984), 
quoting Teamsters v. United State.s, 431 U. S. 324, 360, n. 46 (1977). 
' •. 
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decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role. 
This balance of burdens is the direct result of Title VII's bal-
ance of rights. 
Our holding casts no shadow on Burdine, in which we de-
cided that, even after a plaintiff has made out a prima facie 
case of discrimination under Title.VII, the burden of persua-
sion does not shift to the employer to show that its stated 
legitimate reason for the employment decision was the true 
reason. 450 U. S., at 256-258. We stress, first, that nei-
ther court below shifted the burden of persuasion to Price 
Waterhouse on this question, and in fact, the District Court 
found that Hopkins had not shown that the firm's stated rea-
son for its decision was pretextual. 618 F. Supp., at 
1114-1115. Moreover, since we hold that the plaintiff re-
tains the burden of persuasion on the issue whether gender 
played a part in the employment decision, the situation be-
fore us is not the one of "shifting burdens" that we addressed 
in Burdine. Instead, the employer's burden is most appro-
priately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must 
persuade the factfinder on one point, and then the employer, 
if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another. See 
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 
400 (1983). 11 
Without explicitly mentioning this portion of § 706(g), we have in the 
past held that Title VII does not authorize affirmative relief for individuals 
as to whom, the employer shows, the existence of systemic discrimination 
had no effect. See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 
772 (1976); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 367-371 (1977); Ea.st 
Texa.s Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodrigu.~z, 431 U. S. 395, 404, n. 9 
(1977). These decisions suggest that the proper focus of § 706(g) is on 
claims of systemic discrimination, not on charges of individual discrimina-
tion. Cf. NLRB v. Transporlation Ma.nagenumt Corp., 462 U. S. 393 
(1983) (upholding the National Labor Relations Board's identical interpre-
tation of§ lO(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 160(c), 
which contains language almost identical to § 706(g)). 
11 Given that both the plaintiff and defendant bear a burden of proof in 
cases such as this one, it is surprising that the dissent insists that our ap-
proach requires the employer to bear "the ultimate burden of proof." 
,;~- • : - ~-- . . 
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Price Waterhouse's claim that the employer does not bear 
any burden of proof (if it bears one at all) until the plaintiff 
has shown "substantial evidence that Price Waterhouse's ex-
planation for failing to promote Hopkins was not the 'true 
reason' for its action" (Brief for Petitioner 20) merely re-
states its argument that the plaintiff in a mixed-motives case 
must squeeze her proof into Burdine's framework. Where a 
decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and il-
legitimate motives, however, it simply makes no sense to ask 
whether the legitimate reason was "the 'true reason'" (Brief 
for Petitioner 20 (emphasis added)) for the decision-which is 
the question asked by Burdine. See Transportation Man-
agement, supra, at 400, n. 5. 12 Oblivious to this last point, 
Post, at 10. It is, moreover, perfectly consistent to say both that gender 
was a factor in a particular decision when it was made and that, when the 
situation is viewed hypothetically and after the fact, the same decision 
would have been made even in the absence of discrimination. Thus, we do 
not see the "internal inconsistency" in our opinion that the dissent per-
ceives. See post, at 6-7. Finally, where liability is imposed because an 
employer is unable to prove that it would have made the same decision 
even if it had not discriminated, this is not an imposition of liability "where 
sex made no difference to the outcome." Post, at 6. In our adversary 
system, where a party has the burden of proving a particular assertion and 
where that party is unable to meet its burden, we assume that that asser-
tion is inaccurate. Thus, where an employer is unable to prove its claim 
that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination, 
we are entitled to conclude that gender did make a difference to the 
outcome. 
a Nothing in this opinion should be taken to suggest that a case must be 
correctly labeled as either a "pretext" case or a ''mb:ed motives" case from 
the beginning in the District Court; indeed, we expect that plaintiffs often 
will allege, in the alternative, that their cases are both. Discovery often 
will be necessary before the plaintiff can know whether both legitimate and 
illegitimate considerations played a part in the decision against her. At 
some point in the proceedings, of course, the District Court must decide 
whether a particular case involves mixed motives. If the plaintiff fails to 
satisfy the factftnder that it is more likely than not that a forbidden charac-
teristic played a part in the employment decision, then she may prevail 
only if she proves, following Burdine, that the employer's stated reason for 
; ' 
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the dissent would insist that Burdine's framework perform 
work that it was never intended to perform. It would re-
quire a plaintiff who challenges an adverse employment deci-
sion in which both legitimate and illegitimate considerations 
played a part to pretend that the decision, in fact, stemmed 
from a single source-for the premise of Bu1·dine is that 
either a legitimate <Yt an illegitimate set of considerations led 
to the challenged decision. To say that Bu1·dine's eviden-
tiary scheme will not help us decide a case admittedly involv-
ing both kinds of considerations is not to cast aspersions on 
the utility of that scheme in the circumstances for which it 
was designed. 
B 
In deciding as we do today, we do not traverse new 
ground. We have in the past confronted Title VII cases in 
which an employer has used an illegitimate criterion to distin-
guish among employees, and have held that it is the employ-
er's burden to justify decisions resulting from that practice. 
When an employer has asserted that gender is a bona fide 
occupational qualification within the meaning of§ 703(e), for 
example, we have assumed that it is the employer who must 
show why it must use gender as a criterion in employment. 
See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 332-337, (1977). 
In a related context, although the Equal Pay Act expressly 
permits employers to pay different wages to women where 
disparate pay is the result of a "factor other than sex," see 29 
U. S. C. § 206(d)(l), we have decided that it is the employer, 
not the employee, who must prove that the actual disparity is 
its decision is pretextuaL The dissent need not worry that this eviden-
tiary scheme, if used during a jury trial, will be so impossibly confused and 
complex as it imagines. See, e. g., post, at 13-14. Juries long have de-
cided cases in which defendant.s raise affirmative defenses. The dissent 
fails, moreover, to explain why the evidentiary scheme that we endorsed 
over ten years ago in Mt. Healthy has not proved unworkable in that con-
text but would be hopelessly complicated in a case brought under federal 
antidiscrimination statutes. 
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not sex-linked. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 
U. S. 188, 196 (1974). Finally, some courts have held that 
under Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act, it is the employer who has the burden of showing that its 
limitations on the work that it allows a pregnant woman to 
perform are necessary in light of her pregnancy. See, e.g., 
Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital, 726 F. 2d 1543, 1548 
(CAll 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F . 2d 1172, 1187 (CA4 
1982). As these examples demonstrate, our assumption al-
ways has been that if an employer allows gender to affect its 
decisionmaking process, then it must carry the burden of jus-
tifying its ultimate decision. We have not in the past re-
quired women whose gender has proved relevant to an em-
ployment decision to establish the negative proposition that 
they would not have been subject to that decision had they 
been men, and we do not do so today. 
We have reached a similar conclusion in other contexts 
where the law announces that a certain characteristic is ir-
relevant to the allocation of burdens and benefits. In Mt. 
Healthy City School Di,st. Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 
U. S. 274 (1977), the plaintiff claimed that he had been dis-
charged as a public school teacher for exercising his free-
speech rights under the First Amendment. Because we did 
not wish to "place an employee in a better position as a result 
of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he 
would have occupied had he done nothing," id. , at 285, we 
concluded that such an employee "ought not to be able, by en-
gaging in such conduct, to prevent his employer from assess-
ing his performance record and reaching a decision not to re-
hire on the basis of that record." Id., at 286. We therefore 
held that once the plaintiff had shown that his constitution-
ally protected speech was a "substantial" or "motivating fac-
tor" in the adverse treatment of him by his employer, the em-
ployer was obligated to prove ''by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to 
[the plaintiff] even in the absence of the protected conduct." 
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Id., at 287. A court that finds for a plaintiff under this 
standard has effectively concluded that an illegitimate motive 
was a "but-for" cause of the employment decision. See 
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 
U. S. 410, 417 (1979). See also Arlington Heights v. Met1·0-
politan Housing Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 270-271, n. 21 (1977) 
(applying Mt. Healthy standard where plaintiff alleged that 
unconstitutional motive had contributed to enactment of leg-
islation); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U. S. 222, 228 (1985) 
(same). 
In Transportation Manage1nent, we upheld the NLRB's 
interpretation of§ lO(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 
which forbids a court to order affirmative relief for discrimi-
natory conduct against a union member "if such individual 
was suspended or discharged for cause." 29 U. S. C. 
§ 160(c). The Board had decided that this provision meant 
that once an employee had shown that his suspension or dis-
charge was based in part on hostility to unions, it was up to 
the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that it would have made the same decision in the absence of 
this impermissible motive. In such a situation, we empha-
sized, "[t]he employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a 
motive that is declared illegitimate by the statute. It is fair 
that he bear the risk that the influence of legal and illegal mo-
tives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the 
risk and because the risk was created not by innocent activity 
but by his own wrongdoing." 462 U. S. , at 403. 
We have, in short, been here before. Each time, we have 
concluded that the plaintiff who shows that an impermissible 
motive played a motivating part in an adverse employment 
decision has thereby placed upon the defendant the burden to 
show that it would have made the same decision in the ab-
sence of the unlawful motive. Our decision today treads this 
well-worn path. 
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C 
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an em-
ployment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at 
the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we 
received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be 
that the applicant or employee was a woman. 18 In the spe-
cific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the 
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that 
she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender. 
Although the parties do not overtly dispute this last propo-
sition, the placement by Price Waterhouse of "sex stereotyp-
ing" in quotation marks throughout its brief seems to us an 
insinuation either that such stereotyping was not present in 
this case or that it lacks legal relevance. We reject both pos-
sibilities. As to the existence of sex stereotyping in this 
case, we are not inclined to quarrel with the District Court's 
conclusion that a number of the partners' comments showed 
sex stereotyping at work. See infra, at 25-26. As for the 
legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day 
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or 
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with 
their group, for "'[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate 
against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to 
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men 
and women resulting from sex stereotypes.'" Los Angeles 
Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 707, 
n. 13 (1978), quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 
F. 2d 1194, 1198 (CA7 1971). An employer who objects to 
13 After comparing this description of the plaintiff's proof to that offered 
by the concurring opinion, post, at 16,, we do not understand why the con-
currence suggests that they are meaningfully different from each other, 
see post, at 15, 17-18. Nor do we see how the inquiry that we have de-
scribed is "hypothetical," see post, at 5, n. 1. It seeks to determine the 
content of the entire set of reasons for a decision, rather than shaving off 
one reason in an attempt to determine what the decision would have been 
in the absence of that consideration. The inquiry that we describe thus 
strikes us as a distinctly non-hypothetical one. 
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aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this 
trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible Catch-
22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if 
they don't. Title VII lifts women out of this bind. 
Remarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not 
inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular em-
ployment decision. The plaintiff must show that the em-
ployer actually relied on her gender in making its decision. 
In making this showing, stereotyped remarks can certainly 
be evidence that gender played a part. In any event, the 
stereotyping in this case did not simply consist of stray re-
marks. On the contrary, Hopkins proved that Price 
Waterhouse invited partners to submit comments; that some 
of the comments stemmed from sex stereotypes; that an im-
portant part of the Policy Board's decision on Hopkins was an 
assessment of the submitted comments; and that Price 
Waterhouse in no way disclaimed reliance on the sex-linked 
evaluations. This is not, as Price Waterhouse suggests, 
"discrimination in the air"; rather, it is, as Hopkins puts it, 
"discrimination brought to ground and visited upon" an em-
ployee. Brief for Respondent 30. By focusing on Hopkins' 
specific proof, however, we do not suggest a limitation on the 
possible ways of proving that stereotyping played a motivat-
ing role in an employment decision, and we refrain from de-
ciding here which specific facts, "standing alone," would or 
would not establish a plaintiff's case, since such a decision is 
unnecessary in this case. But see post, at 17 (JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR, concurring in judgment). 
As to the employer's proof, in most cases, the employer 
should be able to present some objective evidence as to its 
probable decision in the absence of an impermissible motive. 14 
"JUSTICE WHITE's suggestion, post, at 3, that the employer's own testi-
mony as to the probable decision in the absence of discrimination is due 
special credence where the court has, contrary to the employer's testi-
mony, found that an illegitimate factor played a part in the decision, is 
baffling. 
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Moreover, proving ''that the same decision would have been 
justified ... is not the same as proving that the same deci-
sion would have been made." Givhan, 439 U. S., at 416, 
quoting Ayers v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 
555 F. 2d 1309, 1315 (CA5 1977). An employer may not, in 
other words, prevail in a mixed-motives case by offering a le-
gitimate and sufficient reason for its decision if that reason 
did not motivate it at the time of the decision. Finally, an 
employer may not meet its burden in such a case by merely 
showing that at the time of the decision it was motivated only 
in part by a legitimate reason. The very premise of a mixed-
motives case is that a legitimate reason was present, and in-
deed, in this case, Price Waterhouse already has made this 
showing by convincing Judge Gesell that Hopkins' interper-
sonal problems were a legitimate concern. The employer in-
stead must show that its legitimate reason, standing alone, 
would have induced it to make the same decision. 
III 
The courts below held that an employer who has allowed a 
discriminatory impulse to play a motivating part in an em-
ployment decision must prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that it would have made the same decision in the ab-
sence of discrimination. We are persuaded that the better 
rule is that the employer must make this showing by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 
Conventional rules of civil litigation generally apply in Title 
VII cases, see, e.g., United States Postal Service Bd. of Gov-
ernors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 716 (1983) (discrimination 
not to be "treat[ed] ... differently from other ultimate ques-
tions of fact"), and one of these rules is that parties to civil 
litigation need only prove their case by a preponderance of 
the evidence. See, e. g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddles-
ton, 459 U. S. 375, 390 (1983). Exceptions to this standard 
are uncommon, and in fact are ordinarily recognized only 
when the government seeks to take unusual coercive action-
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action more dramatic than entering an award of money dam-
ages or other conventional relief-against an individual. See 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 756 (1982) (termination 
of parental rights); Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 427 
(1979) (involuntary commitment); Woodby v. INS, 385 U. S. 
276 (1966) (deportation); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 
U. S. 118, 122, 125 (1943) (denaturalization). Only rarely 
have we required clear and convincing proof where the action 
defended against seeks only conventional relief, see, e. g., 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 342 (1974) (defa-
mation), and we find it significant that in such cases it was 
the defendant rather than the plaintiff who sought the ele-
vated standard of proof-suggesting that this ·standard ordi-
narily serves as a shield rather than, as Hopkins seek_s t_o use 
it, as a sword. 
It is true, as Hopkins emphasizes, that we have noted the 
"clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to 
establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage 
and the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix 
the amount." Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment 
Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555, 562 (1931). Likewise, an EEOC 
regulation does require federal agencies proved to have vio-
lated Title VII to show by clear and convincing evidence that 
an individual employee is not entitled to relief. See 29 CFR 
§ 1613.271(c)(2) (1988). And finally, it is true that we have 
emphasized the importance of make-whole relief for victims 
of discrimination. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 
U. S. 405 (1975). Yet each of these sources deals with the 
proper determination of relief rather than with the initial 
finding of liability. This is seen most easily in the EEOC's 
regulation, which operates only after an agency or the EEOC 
has found that "an employee of the agency was discriminated 
against." See 29 CFR § 1613.271(c) (1988). Because we 
have held that, by proving that it would have made the same 
decision in the absence of discrimination, the employer may 
avoid a finding of liability altogether and not simply avoid 
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certain equitable relief, these authorities do not help Hopkins 
to show why we should elevate the standard of proof for an 
employer in this position. 
Significantly, the cases from this Court that most resemble 
this one, Mt. Healthy and Transpm-tation Management, did 
not require clear and convincing proof. Mt. Healthy, 429 
U. S., at 287; TranspO?-tation Management, 462 U. S., at 
400, 403. We are not inclined to say that the public policy 
against firing employees because they spoke out on issues of 
public concern or because they affiliated with a union is less 
important than the policy against discharging employees on 
the basis of their gender. Each of these policies is vitally 
important, and each is adequately served by requiring proof 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Although Price Waterhouse does not concretely tell us how 
its proof was preponderant even if it was not clear and con-
vincing, this general claim is implicit in its request for the 
less stringent standard. Since the lower courts required 
Price Waterhouse to make its proof by clear and convincing 
evidence, they did not determine whether Price Waterhouse 
had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it would 
have placed Hopkins' candidacy on hold even if it had not per-
mitted sex-linked evaluations to play a part in the decision-
making process. Thus, we shall remand this case so that 
that determination can be made. 
IV 
The District Court found that sex stereotyping "was per-
mitted to play a part" in the evaluation of Hopkins as a candi-
date for partnership. 618 F. Supp., at 1120. Price 
Waterhouse disputes both that stereotyping occurred and 
that it played any part in the decision to place Hopkins' candi-
dacy on hold. In the firm's view, in other words, the District 
Court's factual conclusions are clearly erroneous. We do not 
agree. 
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In finding that some of the partners' comments reflected 
sex stereotyping, the District Court relied in part on Dr. 
Fiske's expert testimony. Without directly impugning Dr. 
Fiske's credentials or qualifications, Price Waterhouse in-
sinuates that a social psychologist is unable to identify sex 
stereotyping in evaluations without investigating whether 
those evaluations have a basis in reality. This argument 
comes too late. At trial, counsel for Price Waterhouse twice 
assured the court that he did not question Dr. Fiske's exper-
tise (App. 25) and failed to challenge the legitimacy of her dis-
cipline. Without contradiction from Price Waterhouse, 
Fiske testified that she discerned sex stereotyping in the 
partners' evaluations of Hopkins and she further explained 
that it was part of her business to identify stereotyping in 
written documents. Id., at 64. We are not inclined to ac-
cept petitioner's belated and unsubstantiated characteriza-
tion of Dr. Fiske's testimony as "gossamer evidence" (Brief 
for Petitioner 20) based only on "intuitive hunches" (id., at 
44) and of her detection of sex stereotyping as "intuitively di-
vined" (id., at 43). Nor are we disposed to adopt the dis-
sent's dismissive attitude toward Dr. Fiske's field of study 
and toward her own professional integrity, see post, at 15, 
n. 5. 
Indeed, we are tempted to say that Dr. Fiske's expert tes-
timony was merely icing on Hopkins' cake. It takes no spe-
cial training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an 
aggressive female employee as requiring "a course at charm 
school." Nor, turning to Thomas Beyer's memorable advice 
to Hopkins, does it require expertise in psychology to know 
that, if an employee's flawed "interpersonal skills" can be 
corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, per-
haps it is the employee's sex and not her interpersonal skills 
that has drawn the criticism. 16 
11 We reject the claim, advanced by Price Waterhouse here and by the 
dissenting judge below, that the District Court clearly erred in finding that 
Beyer was "responsible for telling [Hopkins] what problems the Policy 
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Price Waterhouse also charges that Hopkins produced no 
evidence that sex stereotyping played a role in the decision to 
place her candidacy on hold. As we have stressed, however, 
Hopkins showed that the partnership solicited evaluations 
from all of the firm's partners; that it generally relied very 
heavily on such evaluations in making its decision; that some 
of the partners' comments were the product of stereotyping; 
and that the firm in no way disclaimed reliance on those par-
ticular comments, either in Hopkins' case or in the past. 
Certainly a plausible-and, one might say, inevitable-con-
clusion to draw from this set of circumstances is that the 
Policy Board in making its decision did in fact take into ac-
count all of the partners' comments, including the comments 
that were motivated by stereotypical notions about women's 
proper deportment. 16 
Price Waterhouse concedes that the proof in Transporta-
tion Management, supra, adequately showed that the em-
ployer there had relied on an impermissible motivation in fir-
ing the plaintiff. Brief for Petitioner 45. But the only 
evidence in that case that a discriminatory motive contrib-
uted to the plaintiff's discharge was that the employer har-
bored a grudge toward the plaintiff on account of his union 
activity; there was, contrary to Price Waterhouse's sugges-
tion, no direct evidence that that grudge had played a role in 
Board had identified with her candidacy." 618 F. Supp., at 1117. This 
conclusion was reasonable in light of the testimony at trial of a member of 
both the Policy Board and the Admissions Committee, who stated that he 
had "no doubt" that Beyer would discuss with Hopkins the reasons for plac-
ing her candidacy on hold and that Beyer ''knew exactly where the prob-
lems were" regarding Hopkins. Tr. 316. 
18 We do not understand the dissenters' dissatisfaction with the District 
Judge's statements regarding the failure of Price Waterhouse to "sensitize" 
partners to the dangers of sexism. Post, at 15-16. Made in the context 
of determining that Price Waterhouse had not disclaimed reliance on sex-
based evaluations, and following the judge's description of the firm's his-
tory of condoning such evaluations, the judge's remarks seem to us 
justified. 
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the decision, and in fact, the employer had given other rea-
sons in explaining the plaintiff's discharge. See 462 U. S., at 
396. If the partnership considers that proof sufficient, we do 
not know why it takes such vehement issue with Hopkins' 
proof. 
Nor is the finding that sex stereotyping played a part in 
the Policy Board's decision undermined by the fact that many 
of the suspect coµiments were made by supporters rather 
than detractors of Hopkins. A negative comment, even 
when made in the context of a generally favorable review, 
nevertheless may influence the decisionmaker to think less 
highly of the candidate; the Policy Board, in fact, did not sim-
ply tally the "yes's" and "no's" regarding a candidate, but 
carefully reviewed the content of the submitted comments. 
The additional suggestion that the comments were made by 
"persons outside the decisionmaking chain" (Brief for Peti-
tioner 48)-and therefore could not have harmed Hopkins-
simply ignores the critical role that partners' comments 
played in the Policy Board's partnership decisions. 
Price Waterhouse appears to think that we cannot affirm 
the factual findings of the trial court without deciding that, 
instead of being overbearing and aggressive and curt, Hop-
kins is in fact kind and considerate and patient. If this is 
indeed its impression, petitioner misunderstands the theory 
on which Hopkins prevailed. The District Judge acknowl-
edged that Hopkins' conduct justified complaints about her 
behavior as a senior manager. But he also concluded that 
the reactions of at least some of the partners were reactions 
to her as a woman manager. Where an evaluation is based 
on a subjective assessment of a person's strengths and weak-
nesses, it is simply not true that each evaluator will focus on, 
or even mention, the same weaknesses. Thus, even if we 
knew that Hopkins had "personality problems," this would 
not tell us that the partners who cast their evaluations of 
Hopkins in sex-based terms would have criticized her as 
sharply (or criticized her at all) if she had been a man. It is 
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not our job to review the evidence and decide that the nega-
tive reactions to Hopkins were based on reality; our percep-
tion of Hopkins' character is irrelevant. We sit not to deter-
mine whether Ms. Hopkins is nice, but to decide whether the 
partners reacted negatively to her personality because she is 
a woman. 
V 
We hold that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves 
that her gender played a motivating part in an employment 
decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only 
by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would 
have made the same decision even if it had not taken the 
plaintiff's gender into account. Because the courts below 
erred by deciding that the defendant must make this proof by 
clear and convincing evidence, we reverse the Court of Ap-
peals' judgment against Price Waterhouse on liability and 
remand the case to that court for further proceedings. 
It is so ordered. 
